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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Quantitative Materiality, Perceived Responsibility and Machiavellianism
on Tax Professionals’ Decision Making regarding Fraud Detection and Reporting in the
PRC
by
YU Qian
Master of Philosophy

Research on fraud detection in accounting has long focused primarily on financial
statement fraud and responsibilities of auditors and company management relating to
such frauds. While tax fraud is also clearly significant, and tax professionals have
responsibilities relating to fraud detection, little prior research has addressed this issue.
The current research examines the impact of quantitative materiality, perceived
responsibility (based on the triangle model of responsibility) and Machiavellianism on
several aspects of tax professionals’ decision making regarding fraud detection and
reporting.
I surveyed all tax professionals in the People’s Republic of China working for one of
the Big 4 public accounting firms. The results indicate that, as anticipated,
Machiavellianism had significant negative associations with tax professionals’ perceived
responsibility to detect fraud, and high Machiavellians judged fraudulent actions to be
less unethical and socially irresponsible. A composite measure of the triangle model of
responsibility was positively associated with participants’ perceived professional
obligation for fraud detection as well as the estimated likelihood of discovering and
reporting fraud. In contrast, quantitative materiality was not associated with perceived
responsibility for fraud detection, ethical judgments or the likelihood of detecting or
reporting fraud.
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The Impact of Quantitative Materiality, Perceived Responsibility and
Machiavellianism on Tax Professionals’ Decision Making Regarding Fraud
Detection and Reporting in the PRC

Chapter 1 Introduction

In prior studies, it has been argued that the public accounting profession has
become overly commercialized (e.g., Citron, 2003). This over commercialization
arguably leads the accounting profession to be profit-oriented. Fierce competition and
self-interested behavior encourages some accounting professionals to meet the
demands of clients as much as possible, even some unethical ones. Unfortunately, the
accountancy profession often defends the interests of their member, clients, or
professional elites, rather than the public interest (Shafer and Gendron, 2005; Canning
and O’Dwyer, 2003).
As an important aspect of the accounting profession, tax professionals’ ethical
behavior has started to draw wide criticism. Concern regarding tax professionals’
ethics is growing, partly due to several famous tax avoidance investigations. Large
accounting firms have been investigated for facilitating overly aggressive tax planning
schemes (Scannell, 2005; Herman, 2004; Johnson, 2004). Different from the audit
profession, tax professionals often take advocacy positions for their clients. They may
pay attention to the tax liabilities they save for the client, which is the monetary result
of their tax services. Stuebs and Wilkison (2010) argue that ethical breakdowns are
caused by the pursuit of commercial gain at the expense of the public interest focus of
the tax practice, and have resulted in a loss to accounting firms of client, government,
employee and public trust. The nature of tax work unavoidably brings several
challenges to tax professionals’ ethics. First, as mentioned above, most of the time tax
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professionals have to satisfy their client’s wishes by reducing their tax liabilities.
However, on the other hand, they are regulated by certain standards 1 and have to
consider the potential impact on their integrity. Thus, dilemmas may occur to
challenge tax professionals’ judgments. Second, tax advice can depend heavily on
individual tax professional judgment. Therefore, because of the subjective nature of
many of the issues involved, aggressive tax planning, bordering on tax fraud, can be
argued to be reasonable. Third, the information provided by their clients is relied upon
by tax professionals unless it appears to be suspicious or questionable. Normally,
independent verification or audit is not required. Therefore, whether the information is
reliable or not will depend on tax professionals’ judgment. Tax professionals may
require limited evidence relating to questionable of suspicious transactions, in order to
please the clients and make profits.
The motivation for the current research is that tax professionals’ ethics should be
an important concern to the accounting profession. Although, prior research on fraud
detection in accounting has long focused on auditors and company management,
recently, DeZoort et al. (2012) argued that tax professionals’ perceived responsibility
for detecting fraud should also be studied. They found that tax professionals would
perceive more responsibility in fraud detection if the tax engagement provided tax
compliance services (vs tax planning services) and if the client was audited by the
same firm (vs audited by another firm). However, their study did not investigate the
effect of quantitative materiality of the fraud on the tax professional’s perceived
responsibility for fraud detection.

In the PRC, Certified Professional Accountants (CPAs) are subject to the Law of the Peoples’ Republic
of China on Certified Public Accountants. Inter alia, this law requires that a CPA should be independent
and objective in a service engagement.
1
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Very little research has been done in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)2 related
to tax professionals’ ethical behavior and no prior study has investigated their
perceived obligations for detection of client tax fraud. So far, the PRC has no specific
regulations and guidelines about tax professionals’ responsibility towards client fraud
and how should they detect or report fraud. Also, the effect of the quantitative
materiality of fraud is an issue that has not been studied on Chinese tax professionals’
decision

making

and

ethical

judgment.

Besides,

among

the

studies

in

Machiavellianism, only one prior study had addressed its effects on Hong Kong
Chinese tax professionals’ decision making (Shafer and Simmons, 2008).
The primary objective of the current research is to investigate the effects of
quantitative materiality towards tax professionals’ perceived responsibility for fraud
detection, ethical judgment and social responsibility judgment regarding client fraud,
and likelihood to discover and report a fraud. Quantitative materiality concept has
been argued to be “abused” and utilized to rationalize a misstatement which is
qualitatively material in nature. “Abuse” the quantitative materiality concept here
means to recognize the qualitative material misstatement (e.g., a fraud) only when it is
quantitatively material. In other words, tax professionals are concerned to be
responsible for quantitative material misstatement only, even when the misstatement is
qualitatively material. I was interested in whether the Chinese tax professional will
thus “abuse” the quantitative materiality concept. Besides quantitative materiality, I
also investigated whether Machiavellianism and triangle model of responsibility would
be associated with the tax professionals’ judgment and behavior listed above.
Machiavellianism is a personality trait which is characterized by a duplicitous
interpersonal style. The triangle model of responsibility is a systematic tool to assess

2

In this paper, the PRC does not include the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
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perceived responsibility which contains three basic elements (i.e., prescription, event,
identity) and three components (i.e., task clarity, professional obligation, personal
control). Both Machiavellianism and the triangle model of responsibility were expected
to have a significant association with the items listed above.
A field survey was adopted as the research method. I surveyed all tax professionals
working for one of the Big 4 public accounting firms in the PRC. The results after the
data analysis indicated that Machiavellianism has significant negative associations
with tax professionals’ perceived responsibility to detect fraud. High Machiavellians
judged fraudulent actions to be less unethical and socially irresponsible and reported a
lower likelihood of reporting tax fraud. A composite measure of the triangle model of
responsibility was positively associated with participants’ perceived professional
obligation for fraud detection as well as the estimated likelihood of discovering and
reporting fraud. The triangle model of responsibility was associated with participants’
ethical judgments and social responsibility judgments. Quantitative materiality was not
associated with perceived responsibility for fraud detection, ethical judgments or the
likelihood of detecting or reporting fraud, which revealed that there is no evidence that
Chinese tax professionals “abuse” the quantitative materiality concept to rationalize
quantitatively non-material but illegal (qualitatively material) acts.
The following section presents a review of the theoretical background regarding
materiality, Machiavellianism and the triangle model of responsibility, and of the
hypothesis development towards tax professionals’ (1) fraud detection responsibility;
(2) ethical judgments regarding fraud; (3) social responsibility judgments regarding
fraud; (4) the likelihood they will discover a fraud; and (5) the likelihood they will
report a fraud. This is followed by a description of the research method and an analysis
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of the results. The final two sections are discussions of the conclusions and limitations
respectively.

5

Chapter 2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development

2.1. Materiality
Materiality is defined as the minimum amount that would make a difference in
financial statement users’ decision processes (Shafer, 2004). It is an expression of
relative significance or importance of a particular matter in context to financial
statements. Materiality is composed of both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
Quantitative materiality is based on the dollar amounts of a misstatement or omission
on the financial performance, without consideration of the qualitative aspects. It
depends on the dollar size of the item or error judged in the particular circumstances of
its omission or misstatement, which has enough impact to affect people’s economic
decisions once it is material. For instance, if the dollar size of the misstatement is over
five percentage of the net income, the misstatement may be considered as
quantitatively material.3 The assessment of what is quantitatively material is a matter
of professional judgment. Furthermore, size of misstatement may also have impact on
professional judgment. Shafer (1999) argued that the size of a misstatement has a
significant impact on auditors’ willingness to subordinate their judgment. Therefore,
the threshold of quantitative materiality can easily become an excuse to ignore
financial report misstatements whose amounts are below the threshold. Nondisclosure
of events whose immediate financial statement impact falls below conventional
quantitative materiality thresholds can easily be rationalized on the grounds that they
have no significant economic consequences (Shafer, 2004).
Qualitative materiality, on the other hand, applies to a misstatement or omission of
information that is significant to the decision making of users of the financial
3

Common methods to quantify materiality also include percentage of gross profit, percentage of total
assets, percentage of total revenue, percentage of equity and so on.
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statements due to its nature, rather than its size. It explicitly acknowledges that certain
types of errors or omissions may be material regardless of their size, due to qualitative
considerations. Illegal acts of any amount are considered as typical qualitatively
material, as they provide information regarding management integrity. Therefore, the
treatment of a certain item or issue in a way that violates laws or regulations, such as
fraud, may be considered as a qualitatively material issue. The effect of qualitative
materiality is controversial. Fedders (1998) argued that the view advanced by legal
scholars and in court decisions is that investors will reject information relating to
quantitatively immaterial illegal acts (even though qualitatively material) as
completely irrelevant to financial decisions. Similarly, Miller (2000) argued that illegal
acts or other questionable behaviors have no economic significance unless they
materially affect the numbers reported in financial statements. However, in Shafer et
al.’s (2004) study, investors considered the nondisclosure of quantitatively immaterial
illegal acts to be unethical, and rejected suggestions that such information lacks moral
intensity. In an experimental setting, investors’ decisions were affected by qualitative
information relating to illegal acts committed by company management, even if such
information had no immediate financial statement impact.

This is perhaps

unsurprising, as investors would ordinarily take into account information concerning
the quality of management in their investment decisions.
However, in the case of professionals such as auditors and tax service providers,
who maintain an agency relationship with management, there would also likely be
costs to the professionals, not the least in terms of this relationship, of highlighting
fraud. Different from investors, auditors and tax professionals have to balance the risk
that they will suffer because of non-detection of the client’s fraud with the costs
derived from the time and labor required to detect the fraud. Shafer (2004) reviewed

7

several court cases related to illegal misstatement and found that the perceived
likelihood of sanctions was significantly lower for misstatements that fell below
quantitative materiality thresholds, which suggests that auditors also question the
enforceability of prohibitions of quantitatively immaterial misstatement. Even though
it can be argued that a qualitative material issue which is quantitatively immaterial
should be disclosed (Longstreth, 1983), qualitative materiality alone may not be
sufficient to affect the professional’s behavior. In the USA, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has been highly critical of auditors for “abusing” the
materiality concept by relying on quantitative materiality only to rationalize small
errors or omissions without considering their qualitative aspects (Shafer, 2002; 2004).
Similarly, tax professionals might also be considered to be influenced more by
quantitative materiality thresholds.

Furthermore, compared to

auditors, tax

professionals who take more of an advocacy role with respect to taxpayers may be
keen to keep favorable relationships with clients. Since qualitative material
misstatement (e.g., fraud) may result in less serious consequences (e.g., less economic
impact, lighter sentence), in light of the cost and relationship with the client, tax
professionals may tend to rationalize the quantitative immaterial misstatement by
abusing the quantitative materiality concept. When a misstatement is qualitatively
material but not quantitatively material, it gives the professionals an opportunity to
dismiss the misstatement in terms of their responsibility. In order to create a balance
between service costs and the chance of undesirable consequences, tax professionals
may lower their perceived responsibility for fraud detection. If the qualitatively
material misstatement is also quantitatively material, tax professionals are likely to
worry about their integrity and possible punishment more. For long-term purposes, tax
professional may care more about their own responsibility than the benefit of the client.
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Therefore, when a misstatement is qualitatively material, whether the misstatement is
also quantitatively material is proposed to affect the tax professional’s perceived
responsibility for fraud detection, if the tax professional “abuses” the quantitative
materiality concept.
Thus, qualitatively material misstatements under the quantitatively material
threshold may be deemed to result in less severe consequences than those over this
threshold. Therefore the perceived likelihood of harm resulting from qualitative
materiality will be lower than that of the quantitative materiality. According to Jones
(1991), people will perceive lower moral imperative when considering less serious
consequences. Therefore, tax professionals may judge the quantitatively immaterial
fraud which is qualitatively material less harshly with regard to ethics. However,
Shafer (2002) found that financial executives view intentional earnings manipulations
as highly unethical even when the amounts involved fall below traditional quantitative
materiality threshold. Also, the dollar amount of a client’s tax law violation cannot be
supported to influence a tax practitioner’s perceived ethical judgment (Marchall et al.,
2006) Therefore, whether quantitative materiality will affect tax professionals’ ethical
judgment when the misstatement is qualitatively material needs to be further studied.
Compared to ethical judgment, social responsibility judgment has not been
addressed in materiality context. However, attitudes toward social responsibility are as
important as ethics regarding ethical decision-making processes (Singhapakdi et al.,
1996). Fisher (2004) investigated prior research and listed four common views 4
regarding the relationship between social responsibility and ethics. According to his
“There are four views concerning the relationship between social responsibility and ethics that can be
identified in the literature. First, social responsibility is ethics in an organizational context; second,
social responsibility focuses on the impact that business activity has on society while ethics is concerned
with the conduct of those within organizations; third, there is no connection between social
responsibility and ethics; and, fourth, social responsibility has various dimensions one of which is ethics.”
Fisher (2004)
4
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study, the most widely supported view is that corporate social responsibility contains
four dimensions and ethical dimension is one of them. Since quantitative materiality
may have some effect on ethical judgment, it is possible that quantitative materiality
will affect social responsibility judgment as well.
The above discussion concerns perceived cognition, which can be the awareness
through which one considers one’s potential actions. In other words, what people think
can lead to what people actually do. Once a tax professional’s perceived responsibility
for fraud detection is affected by the quantitative materiality condition, for example, he
perceives more responsibility if the fraud (qualitatively material) is quantitatively
material, he would like to take action to avoid the serious consequences which is the
reflection of

tax professional’s responsibility. Also, maintain the misstatement

qualitatively material, once the level of quantitative materiality differs, the different
consequences may bring varying degree of impact to tax professionals. They have to
consider their own interests if the fraud affects them profoundly. In that case, tax
professionals may be likely to choose to discover a fraud and report it in order to
protect themselves. Therefore, quantitative materiality is expected to be associated
with the likelihood to discover and report a fraud. However, no prior study has
addressed this issue in a taxation context. Due to the lack of prior evidence regarding
the effects of quantitative vs. qualitative materiality in taxation, the following
hypothesis is put forward in null form:

Hypothesis 1: the dollar amounts of a tax fraud have no effect on tax professionals’
(a) perceived responsibility for fraud detection, judgments of the (b) ethicality and
(c) social responsibility of the fraud, and estimated likelihoods of (d) discovering
and (e) reporting the fraud.
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2.2. Machiavellianism
I also sought to investigate the influence of Machiavellianism on tax professionals’
judgment and behavior in front of the client’s fraud scheme. In modern psychology,
Machiavellianism is used to describe one of the “dark triad”5 personalities, which are
characterized by a duplicitous interpersonal style. Machiavellianism construct was
intended to capture a manipulative, cold and calculating personality (Christie, 1970a).
Machiavellianism is specified embodied in: 1) advocacy of manipulative tactics such
as the use of guile or deceit; 2) an unflattering view of humans as being weak,
cowardly, and easily manipulated; and 3) a lack of concern with conventional morality
(Christie, 1970b; Christie and Lehmann, 1970).
The construct appears to be relevant to many ethical decision-making contexts. It
seems that people who are Machiavellians are more manipulative and deceitful with
less concern about conventional behavior and public interest. Machiavellians are
argued to have less sense of morality and they will intend to take unethical actions.
Ross and Robertson (2000) studied salesperson’s lying in the person-situation
interactionist framework and found that high Machiavellians were more likely to
exploit the lack of clear ethical guidelines to mislead others. Similarly, Wirtz and Kum
(2004) pointed out that high Machiavellians believe it is more acceptable to violate the
intellectual property and privacy rights of others. Seen from prior research,
Machiavellians tend to seek their own benefit no matter whether their behavior will
result in harm to others. Machiavellians would like to take as little responsibility as
possible for others, so that Machiavellian tax professionals are likely to maximize their
own interest without considering the public benefit. In terms of fraud detection, since
auditors are considered to be responsible for this and the regulation of tax
This “dark triad” consists of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (Paulhus and Williams,
2002).
5
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professional’s responsibility regarding fraud detection is not explicit, tax professionals
who are Machiavellians are likely to perceive less responsibility for fraud detection
than those who are not Machiavellians.
Machiavellianism seems to affect people’s behavior as well as their ethical
judgment. Prior research with business setting indicated that high Machiavellians have
lower ethical standard, and the possibility of them to conduct the unethical actions is
higher. Machiavellianism has been found to influence individuals’ perceptions of the
importance of ethics and social responsibility in business (Vitell and Paolillo, 2004).
With respect to the tax profession, Machiavellianism has a highly significant effect on
intentional tax noncompliance (Ghosh and Crain, 1995). Machiavellian tax
professionals are more likely to believe less strongly in the importance of corporate
ethics and social responsibility and judge aggressive tax avoidance schemes more
leniently (Shafer and Simmons, 2008). Therefore, in the current research,
Machiavellianism is also proposed to have a negative relationship with a tax
professional’s ethical judgment and social responsibility judgment.
Den Hartog and Belschak (2012) found that positive consequences of ethical leader
behavior were likely to be suppressed when leaders were highly Machiavellian. These
consequences include taking responsibility for one’s actions. In an accounting context,
Dalton and Radtke (2013) argued that high Machiavellians will be less likely to report
issues of corporate malfeasance. They also found Machiavellianism is negatively
associated with perceived seriousness, benefits, and responsibility in whistle-blowing
contexts. Seen from Dalton and Radtke’s study, high Machiavellians have personalities
characterized by with selfishness and a lack of concern. Tax professionals who are
more Machiavellian are hence expected to be more concerned with their own interest
and perceive less responsibility for the public benefit. They are also expected to take
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less effort to discover and report a fraud. Therefore, Machiavellianism is expected to
negatively affect tax professionals’ likelihood to discover a fraud and report it. The
discussion above indicates the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Machiavellianism will be associated with (a) lower levels of
perceived responsibility for fraud detection, less harsh judgments of the (b)
ethicality and (c) social responsibility of the fraud, and lower estimated likelihoods
of (d) discovering and (e) reporting the fraud.

2.3. Triangle Model of Responsibility
Schlenker et al. (1994) first introduced the triangle model of responsibility, a
systematic tool to assess perceived responsibility, to study the internal motivation
responsibility. The triangle model is shown in Figure 1 below. The model contains
three elements: a) the prescriptions that should be guiding the actor’s conduct on the
occasion, b) the event that occurred (or is anticipated) that is relevant to the
prescriptions, and c) a set of identity images that are relevant to the prescriptions and
that describe the actor’s role, qualities, convictions, and aspirations.

These three

elements constitute a triangle, which indicts that they interact with each other. Besides,
the linkages between each element jointly explain the internal motivation for perceived
responsibility. People feel responsible in a situation to the extent that a) a clear, welldefined set of prescriptions is applicable to the event (prescription-event link), b) the
actor is perceived to be bound by the prescriptions by virtue of his or her identity
(prescription-identity link), and c) the actor seems to be connected to the event,
especially by seeming to have (or to have had) personal control over the event, such as
by intentionally producing the consequences (identity-event link). The prescription-
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event link, prescription-identity link, and identity-event link each refers to task clarity,
professional obligation, and personal control. Task clarity relates to authoritative
guidance clarity and knowledge of procedures, professional obligation relates to
detection relevance and obligation, while personal control relates to ability to control
and contribute to detection.

FIGURE 1
Triangle Model of Responsibility

Prescriptions
Task clarity

Professional
obligation

Event

Identity
Personal control

According to the triangle model, if people are seen as responsible for an upcoming
event, the event becomes more psychologically significant to them (Schlenker et al.,
1994). The triangle model of responsibility has been found to have high correlation
with people’s judgment about others’ responsibility and their own responsibility.
Strength of the three triangle model links can be directly related to how people judge
others’ responsibility (Schlenker et al., 1994). Experimental studies have shown that
employees would perceive more responsibility for their employment status under the
lead of stronger triangle model links, such as be more responsible for their job
14

performance (Woul, Pritchard and Kelly, 2002). Also, Christopher and Schlenker
(2005) did several experiments to argue that stronger links produce perceptions of
greater personal responsibility on task performance (e.g., applying for a job, taking a
college course) than weak links. The above discussion suggests that in tax services
context, tax professionals who perceive stronger triangle model links are expected to
be more responsible for their job performance and service outcome. Fraud is the event
which is abnormal and harmful to their profession for which they should be primary
responsible. Therefore, they would likely perceive more responsibility for fraud
detection.
The model indicates that responsibility is the adhesive that connects an actor to an
event and to relevant prescriptions that should govern conduct, and thus it provides a
basis for judgment and sanctioning (Schlenker et al., 1994). Schlenker et al. argued in
their research that as suggested by the triangle model of responsibility, when the
potency of the elements of the triangle and the strength of the linkages increase in
magnitude, the intensity of the social judgment of the actor (positively or negatively)
and the amount of sanctioning will also increase. They also argued that stronger
triangle model links are helpful to increase people’s ego involvement with an event
and commitment binding a self to something else (e.g., a set of ideas, a goal, an
organization, or another person). Tax professionals will tend to develop the same
values as the tax profession and agree with their regulations if they perceive strong
triangle model links. Therefore, stronger triangle model links can lead to more harsh
judgments towards the ethicality and social responsibility of fraud, an unethical action
showing no social responsibility.
As mentioned in the last paragraph, responsibility is the adhesive that connects an
actor to relevant prescriptions that should govern conduct. Tax professionals who
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realize strong professional obligation links will believe they are obligated to detect the
fraud and defend their own integrity. Also, strong task clarity link will contribute to the
confidence of tax professionals’ actions. Once tax professionals consider they have
control over the event, as the personal control link suggests, they will be more likely to
be motived to detect a fraud and correct it. Therefore, the triangle model of
responsibility links are proposed to have positive effects on tax professionals’
estimated likelihoods of discovering and reporting the fraud. Based on the discussion
reviewed above, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: The strength of the triangle model of responsibility links will be
associated with (a) higher levels of perceived responsibility for fraud detection,
harsher judgments of the (b) ethicality and (c) social responsibility of the fraud, and
higher estimated likelihoods of (d) discovering and (e) reporting the fraud.
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Chapter 3 Research Method

3.1. Instrument
A field survey of tax practitioners in the PRC was used to address the research
question and hypotheses. A research instrument was prepared of which there were
three parts. In the first part, the participants were provided with a case (see Appendix 1)
which required them to assume they were providing tax services for a current client.
The case was developed in cooperation with a tax partner employed by one of the Big
4 public accounting firms in the PRC.
The case informed participants that the client was committing a fraud (qualitatively
material), while quantitative materiality was manipulated on a between-subjects basis
(material / immaterial). 6 The fraud involved the purchasing and selling of goods
outside the company’s books, the cash flows from these activities being recorded in
hidden accounts. The case specified that the client had been issued unqualified audit
reports for years by the external auditor (not associated with the participant’s firm),
and that no one from the client or from the audit team had yet detected the fraud.
Participants provided materiality judgments on a seven-point Likert scale anchored
on “immaterial” (1) and “highly material” (7). 7 The six items that measured the
triangle model links (DeZoort et al., 2012) and their measurement scales are illustrated
in the Appendix 2. Participants were also asked a series of questions relating to the
other dependent variables of interest, including: (1) perceived responsibility for fraud

6

In the material version of the case, the fraud was forty percent of taxable income, well in excess of
common materiality thresholds. In the immaterial version, the fraud was only one percent of taxable
income. “Although the professional literature does not explicitly define a ‘normal’ materiality limit,
many auditors consider it to be 5% of net income” (Weinstein, 2007). Also, according to SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99: “One rule of thumb in particular suggests that the misstatement or
omission of an item that falls under a 5% threshold is not material…”
7

Unless otherwise noted, all Likert scales included in the instrument were seven-point scales.

17

detection (the primary dependent measure investigated by DeZoort et al. (2012); (2)
ethical judgments regarding the client’s fraud; 3) social responsibility judgments
regarding the fraud; 4) the estimated likelihood of discovering the fraud; and 5) the
likelihood that they would report the fraud (See the Appendix 2 for measurement
scales).
In Part Two, participants completed the widely used Mach IV Machiavellianism
scale (Christie and Geis, 1970), consisting of twenty items (see Appendix 2).
Responses were collected through a seven-point Likert scale anchored on “disagree
strongly” (1) and “agree strongly” (7).
Finally, demographic information was collected in Part Three, including
participants’ gender, age, professional qualification, years of working experience,
position, and percentage of their total work hours devoted to taxation.
An online survey system provided by Qualtrics Software Company was adopted to
distribute the questionnaire. The link to the questionnaire was sent to participants by
email. The instrument was accompanied by a cover letter that informed participants
that all responses were anonymous and would be treated as strictly confidential. In
order to increase the response rate, reminder emails were sent two weeks and again at
four weeks after the website link was initially distributed.
The original English version of the questionnaire was translated into Chinese. The
common procedure of back-translation was used to enhance the accuracy of the
translation. The English version was translated to the Chinese by a bilingual
accounting graduate student. This initial translation was then translated back to English
by another accounting graduate student. All differences between the initial and backtranslated English versions were resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the translators.
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The Chinese version of the instrument was then reviewed by a Chinese accounting
professor to provide further assurance of its validity and understandability.

3.2. Participants
The survey was conducted with the cooperation of one of the Big 4 accounting
firms in the PRC. I surveyed all tax professionals working for the firm in the PRC.
Approximately 1,200 instruments were distributed to employees ranging from entrylevel staff to partner. A total of 191 usable responses were received, which represented
a response rate of approximately 16 percent. Demographic details of the respondents
are shown in Table 1.
The respondents included 73 junior staff, 59 senior staff, 51 managers and 8
partners. The mean age of the respondents was 28.81. The average years of working
experience was 5.27 and the average years of experience with the current firm was
4.28. Of the 191 respondents, 132 respondents were female (69.1 percent). There were
60 CPAs or equivalent (e.g., ACCA), 48 Certified Tax Agents (CTA)8, 15 qualified
lawyers, and 1 Certified Internal Auditor. A total of 79 respondents reported no
professional qualifications. Respondents spent almost 90 percent of their total work
hours on taxation.

3.3. Non-response bias
In order to detect any non-response bias, ANOVA tests of continuous independent
variables (i.e., the composite measure of strength of triangle model of responsible link,

8

Certified Tax Agents are professionals who obtain a qualification within the territory of the PRC to
provide general tax services and tax certification services. Tax certification services include certain
professional assessments and tax return certifications. However, in August 2014 the State Council
removed the CTA qualification, as well as other qualifications, from the entrance requirements for
qualified tax practitioner in the PRC.
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Machiavellianism) and dependent variables (i.e. perceived responsibility for fraud
detection, ethical judgment, socially responsible judgment, likelihood of discovering,
and likelihood of reporting) were run between early and late responses. Responses
were divided into three batches, i.e., responses collected before the first reminder email
sent (Batch One), responses collected after first reminder email sent and before the
second reminder email sent (Batch Two), and responses collected after the second
reminder email sent (Batch Three). None of the independent variables and dependent
variables shows significant group differences among three batches, thus showing no
evidence of non-response bias.

20

TABLE 1
Demographic Summary
Sample size by position:
Junior
Senior
Manager
Partner
Total

73 (38.2%)
59 (30.9%)
51 (26.7%)
8 (4.2%)
191

Mean age
(Standard deviation)

28.81
(4.94)

Mean total experience (years)
(Standard deviation)

5.27
(4.77)

Mean experience in current firm (years)
(Standard deviation)

4.28
(3.54)

Gender:
Male
Female

59 (30.9%)
132 (69.1%)

Certification:
CPA or equivalent
CTA
Others
None

60
48
16
79
88.63
(17.53)

Percentage of total work spent on taxation (%)
(Standard deviation)
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Chapter 4 Results and Analysis

4.1. Preliminary analysis
As a further test of the validity of the case, participants were asked to rate its
understandability and reality. The responses suggest that participants viewed the case
as relatively easy to understand (mean=2.30; 1= “very easy to understand”; 7= “very
difficult to understand”) and realistic (mean=4.85; 1= “not at all realistic”; 7= “very
realistic”).
The means for the five dependent measures by quantitative materiality level are
reported in Table 2. The results indicate that although respondents to the high
quantitatively material situation perceived more responsibility for fraud detection,
judged the client’s action to be less ethical and socially responsible, and reported a
higher likelihood of discovering and reporting the fraud, only the difference in social
responsibility judgments was statistically significant (p-value=.006). Therefore,
Hypothesis 1(a), 1(b), 1(d), and 1(e) were supported, while Hypothesis 1(c) was
rejected.
In general, these results provide no evidence that participants “abused” the
quantitative materiality concept. That is, I found no clear evidence that participants
attempted to minimize the significance of the quantitatively immaterial fraud, or deny
responsibility for its detection or reporting.
Exploratory principal components factor analyses with varimax rotation were
performed for the triangle model measures. A minimum cutoff for factor loadings was
set at .4. The factor loading results for the triangle model are shown in Table 3. As
previously discussed, the triangle model has three a priori links (task clarity,
professional obligation and personal control), each of which is measured by two items.
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However, in the current study all six of the items loaded on a single factor. With one
exception (clear authoritative guidance), each of the six items had relatively strong
factor loadings ranging from .68 to .79. These results indicate that participants did not
discriminate clearly among the three conceptual components of the triangle model.
Therefore, all of the six items were averaged to construct an overall measure of
responsibility. The composite responsibility scores had a relatively strong coefficient
alpha of .779.
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TABLE 2
Means (Standard Deviations) for Dependent Measures by Quantitative Materiality Level
Mean
(S.D)

Detection
Responsibility

Ethical

Socially
Responsible

Likelihood of
Discovering

Likelihood of
Reporting

Material

5.13
(1.46)

6.31
(1.14)

6.3
(1.07)

4.94
(1.51)

5.31
(1.53)

Immaterial

4.85
(1.40)

6.07
(1.00)

5.86
(1.07)

4.82
(1.54)

5.09
(1.59)

Sig. between groups

.190

.125

.006

.577

.332

Quant. Materiality

Note: All items were measured on 7-point Likert scales.

Legend:
Detection Responsibility: Perceived responsibility for fraud detection, 1=“no responsibility”; 7= “full responsibility”
Ethical: Ethical Judgment, 1=“ethical”; 7=“unethical”
Socially Responsible: 1=“socially responsible”; 7=“not socially responsible”
Likelihood of discovering: 1=“highly unlikely”; 7=“highly likely”
Likelihood of reporting: 1=“highly unlikely”; 7=“highly likely”
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TABLE 3
Factor Analysis for Triangle Model
Total Variance Explained
Component
Dimension

1
2
3
4
5
6

Initial Eigenvalues
Total
% of Variance
2.931
48.842
.913
15.213
.816
13.607
.545
9.077
.451
7.522
.344
5.739

Cumulative %
48.842
64.055
77.662
86.739
94.261
100.000

Rotated Component Matrixa
RelJob
.679
ClrGuid
.474
Obligat
.733
Contrib
.788
Inform
.744
Control
.731
a. One component extracted
Legend:
RelJob: Relevance of detection of fraud to the job
ClrGuid: Clarity of professional guidance
Obligat: Professional obligation to detect fraud
Contrib: Contribution that participants could make to detection of the fraud
Inform: How informed participants are regarding effective procedures for fraud detection
Control: Degree of control participants have over the fraud detection
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Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cumulative %
2.931 48.842
48.842

To test the internal reliability of the Machiavellianism items, I computed the
coefficient alpha. The computed coefficient of .788 compares favorably with that
reported in several previous studies (e.g., Christie and Geis, 1970; Zook and Sipps,
2001). The scores for the twenty Machiavellianism items were averaged to construct the
Machiavellianism scores.

Some items required reverse scoring (see Appendix 2).

Higher averaged scores indicate higher Machiavellianism. The mean Machiavellianism
score was 3.32, with a standard deviation of 0.64.
Preliminary tests were run to gauge the potential effects of the demographic
variables. Univariate ANOVA models revealed that certifications held and position in
the firm did not have a significant impact on any of the dependent measures. Gender
was significantly associated with participants’ estimated likelihood of reporting the
fraud (p =.018). In this case, females were significantly more likely to report the fraud
(mean=5.39) than males (mean=4.81). Preliminary correlation analyses were run to test
for associations between the continuous demographic variables and the dependent
measures.

These models indicated that age, total years of experience, years of

experience with the current firm and the percentage of total work time spent on
taxation were significantly and positively associated with ethical judgments regarding
the client fraud (greater age and experience levels and higher percentages of time spent
working in taxation were all associated with more harsh ethical judgments). The
number of years of experience with the current firm was also positively associated with
the likelihood of reporting the client fraud. The demographic measures that were
significantly associated with the dependent measures were incorporated into the
multiple regression models where appropriate9.

9

When age and experience levels were included in the model for ethical judgments, they created
significant multicollinearity problems, and thus were excluded from the multivariate analysis.
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4.2. Hypothesis tests
The correlation analysis among the dependent and independent variables is shown
in Table 4. All the variables were highly correlated at a significance level of .01. The
composite measure of responsibility derived from the triangle model items was
positively correlated with perceived responsibility for fraud detection, ethical and
social responsibility judgments, and the likelihood of discovering and reporting the
fraud. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 3, respondents who perceived higher levels of
professional obligation, task clarity, and personal control over the detection of fraud
perceived more responsibility for fraud detection, judged the fraud scheme as less
ethical and socially responsible, and reported higher likelihoods of discovering and
reporting the fraud.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Machiavellianism was significantly and negatively
correlated with all the dependent variables. This indicates that high Machiavellians
perceived less responsibility for fraud detection, judged the fraud scheme to be less
unethical and socially responsible, and reported lower likelihoods of discovering and
reporting the fraud.
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TABLE 4
Correlation Coefficients
DetectResp
DetectResp
Ethical
SResp
LDiscov
LReport
TriResp
Mach

Ethical SResp LDiscov LReport TriResp
.283** .315**
.284**
.455** .619**
.794**
.256**
.333** .288**
.238**
.368** .343**
.353** .337**
.397**

Mach
-.410**
-.381**
-.425**
-.230**
-.403**
-.316**

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Legend
DetectResp: Perceived responsibility
Ethical: Ethical Judgment
SResp: Social Responsibility
LDiscov: Likelihood to discover
LReport: Likelihood to report
TriResp: Triangle model of responsibility measures
Mach: Machiavellianism measures
Regression analysis was used to simultaneously test the associations between the
dependent and independent measures.

The models for each of the five dependent

measures are reported in Table 5. The demographic variables found to have significant
effect based on the univariate analyses were included when appropriate.
To test Hypothesis 1, for part (a), (b), (d), and (e), consistent with the tests of mean
differences by quantitative materiality level, the models in Panel A, Panel B, Panel D
and Panel E indicated that quantitative materiality did not have significant effects on
perceived responsibility for fraud detection, ethical judgments regarding the fraud, or
the estimated likelihoods of discovering and reporting the fraud. However, for part (c),
as Panel C indicates, quantitative materiality had a significant impact on tax
professionals’

social

responsibility judgments
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(p

=.034),

which

means

tax

professionals will judge a quantitatively material fraud to be less socially responsible
than a quantitatively immaterial fraud.
Machiavellianism had highly significant (p =.000) negative associations with four
of the five dependent measures (see Panels A, B, C and E in Table 5). Thus, consistent
with Hypothesis 2, tax professionals who were more Machiavellian perceived less
responsibility for fraud detection, judged the fraud to be less unethical and socially
irresponsible, and reported a lower likelihood of reporting the fraud. However, the
association between Machiavellianism and the likelihood of discovering the fraud was
only marginally significant (p =.057). One possible explanation for this finding might
be that Machiavellianism is a psychological construct, , while the likelihood of
discovering a fraud relies more on technical competence. The conclusions based on
the regression analyses were generally consistent with those based on the correlation
analysis. Therefore, Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(e) were supported.
As indicated in all Panels of Table 5, the composite measure of the triangle model
of responsibility links had significant associations with all the dependent variables.
The higher the composite measure of triangle model links, the more responsibility
respondents perceived for fraud detection. Stronger links also were associated with
judgments that the fraud was less ethical and socially responsible, and with higher
estimated probabilities that the fraud would be both detected and reported. These
results were consistent with the observed correlations among these variables, and
provide strong support for each component of Hypothesis 3.
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TABLE 5
Regressions using Composite Triangle Measure
n=191
Panel A: Effects on perceived fraud detection responsibility

Independent variables:
Quantitative Materiality
Composite measure of triangle model links
Machiavellianism
Model F-value
Model significance
Model adjusted R2

Std. β
-.023
.548
-.238

t-statistic
-.416
9.314
-4.112

p-value
.678
.000
.000

Std. β
.058
.176
-.307
.120

t-statistic
.869
2.501
-4.394
1.813

p-value
.386
.013
.000
.071

Std. β
.138
.207
-.350

t-statistic
2.142
3.041
-5.241

p-value
.034
.003
.000

47.976
.000
.435

Panel B: Effects on ethical judgments

Independent variables:
Quantitative Materiality
Composite measure of triangle model links
Machiavellianism
Percentage of total work spent on taxation
Model F-value
Model significance
Model adjusted R2

11.179
.000
.176

Panel C: Effects on social responsibility judgments

Independent variables:
Quantitative Materiality
Composite measure of triangle model links
Machiavellianism
Model F-value
Model significance
Model adjusted R2

20.487
.000
.235
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Panel D: Effects on likelihood of discovery

Independent variables:
Quantitative Materiality
Composite measure of triangle model links
Machiavellianism
Model F-value
Model significance
Model adjusted R2

Std. β
-.024
.298
-.138

t-statistic
-.352
4.087
-1.914

p-value
.725
.000
.057

Std. β
-.015
.298
-.283
-.100
.086

t-statistic
-.229
4.403
-4.188
-1.556
1.325

p-value
.819
.000
.000
.121
.187

9.415
.000
.117

Panel E: Effects on likelihood of reporting

Independent variables:
Quantitative Materiality
Composite measure of triangle model links
Machiavellianism
Gender
Experience with current firm
Model F-value
Model significance
Model adjusted R2

13.154
.000
.242
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Discussion

The current study further investigates the responsibility of tax professionals in the
context of tax fraud. It contributes to the understanding of tax professionals’ awareness
of their responsibility for fraud detection in the PRC. In the analysis of how
quantitative materiality affects the perception of tax professionals towards clients’
fraud schemes, no evidence was found that quantitative materiality had an association
with tax professionals’ judgments regarding the perceived responsibility for fraud
detection, judgments of ethicality, and the estimated likelihoods of discovering and
reporting the fraud. Thus these findings provide no evidence to suggest tax
professionals in the PRC "abuse" the quantitative materiality concept to rationalize
intentional quantitative material misstatement. In general, tax professionals in this
research appear to recognize that even quantitatively immaterial frauds may be
qualitatively material. However, quantitative materiality was found to be negatively
associated with tax professionals’ judgments of the socially responsibility of the fraud.
Tax professionals consider quantitatively material fraud to be less social responsible
than the quantitatively immaterial fraud. Even though fraud is judged to be unethical
no matter of the quantitative materiality, quantitatively immaterial fraud seems to
results in less serious consequences, for example, less economic impact. When people
are judging the social responsibility of a client, they may also think about other
dimensions, such as economy, legal, and philanthropy (Fisher, 2004).
The results of Hypothesis 2 testing firstly indicate that Machiavellianism has
significant negative associations with tax professionals’ perceived responsibility to
detect fraud. This finding suggests that this personality trait has a significant effect on
tax professional’s behavior. It might be argued that education may be necessary to
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counter high levels of Machiavellianism. According to Simmons et al. (2013),
undergraduate students’ levels of Machiavellianism may be decreased by ethics
education, although there is no evidence to suggest such education works on post
graduates and professionals. On the other hand, specific regulation and accountability
with clear guidelines may be also required to force Machiavellian tax professionals to
be more aware of their own risk and possible punishment when considering their
personal benefit. Second, Machiavellian tax professionals were found to judge the
ethicality

and

social

responsibility

of

client’s

fraud

scheme

less

harshly.

Machiavellians themselves have lower ethical standards, and they also believe less in
the importance of social responsibility. By contrast, due to selfishness, Machiavellians
will likely primarily consider their personal interest. Therefore, they may subjectively
lower the ethical standard to rationalize the wrong doing in order to benefit from
providing the tax services. Third, tax professionals who were Machiavellian were
found to estimate a lower likelihood of reporting the fraud. This may have resulted
from their low ethical standard and cold personality. They did not believe the scheme
was unethical so that they were not obligated to be responsible for it. Among the
results, Machiavellianism was found to have no significant association with tax
professionals’ estimation of likelihood to discover a fraud. Machiavellianism is a kind
of “dark” personality characteristic, while likelihood to discover a fraud is partially
about one’s capability. Whether a fraud can be discovered may depend on whether the
tax professionals are knowledgeable and skillful, not only on whether they are
powerful enough to have control over the event.
For Hypothesis 3 a composite measure of the triangle model of responsibility links
was found to be associated with higher levels of perceived responsibility for fraud
detection, harsher judgments of the ethicality and social responsibility of the fraud, and
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higher estimated likelihoods of discovering and reporting the fraud. This finding has
practical implications. The professional obligation link suggests that tax professionals
who had a sense of duty and obligation in the face of fraud were more responsible for
fraud detection and more ethical. Tax profession institutions and tax service firms
might consider strengthening tax professionals’ sense of professional obligation by
education or training. In the preliminary tests, qualification was found to have no effect
on tax professionals’ behavior regarding fraud detection, suggesting that, compared to
specific regulation, qualification is less important. The task clarity link suggests clear
authoritative guidance could be very helpful in improving the ethical environment. The
PRC nowadays does not have national legislation specifically related to tax
professionals’ responsibility for fraud detection, as well as the procedure tax
professionals can take when fraud is discovered. Therefore, the PRC authorities may
consider clarifying and strengthening the responsibility of tax professionals through
establish relevant legislation and procedures. Finally, as the personal control link
suggested, tax professionals who had more control and possible contribution over
fraud detection were likely to have more responsibility, higher ethical standard and
moral actions. However, due to firm structure and seniority arrangements, not
everyone can exercise control. Nonetheless, individual firms might consider
establishing rules and regulations for reporting, including those protecting the whistle
blower.
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Chapter 6 Limitations

The current study extends research into tax professionals’ responsibility towards
fraud detection. Some limitations should however be mentioned. The first important
limitation is lack of task realism. The survey is based on hypothetical manipulated
scenarios.

In order to maintain controllability, realism may be sacrificed.

Also,

although the research instrument designed for this particular study had been thoroughly
reviewed by independent experts, it had not been validated by earlier studies.
In all such studies, the possibility of demand effect exists, i.e., the subjects may
provide the answers they believe the researchers want, not responses based on their
true beliefs. This limitation may affect the results to a certain extent and lower the
reliability of the findings. However, the questions in the questionnaire were placed
randomly to prevent hypothesis guessing by the respondents. The researcher gave clear
instructions and ensured protection for subjects’ privacy to increase the reliability of
the data.
The next limitation is that the research does not include the effect of possible
economic dependence on tax agents’ behavior. Tax agents may be inclined to advocate
their client’s position and perceive less responsibility for detecting clients’ fraud if
they are overly dependent on the tax fee. If the services provided are for audit as well
as tax services, this economic dependence may be even stronger. Investigation into
these effects will be left for future research.
All the participants are from the same firm, and the research fails to take certain
characteristics of the respondent’s firm into account. These characteristics may restrict
the generalizability of the results. For example, the behavior of tax professionals may
affected by the content of their employment contract, code of ethics set by the firm, the
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ethical culture in the firm, as well as the management ethics. Also the limitation of
sample selection may also cause bias and lower the reliability of the results. As one of
the Big 4 firms, the professionals in which may be better trained than other
professionals in local firms. However, in the real world, it is hard to assume that the
entire professional is well trained.
Last but not least, in current research, data can be correlational in nature without
providing a basis for establishing causality. The measures of triangle model links,
perceived responsibility, ethical judgment and actions taken were all based on
individual’s cognition towards a certain event, so that they might well be highly
correlated. However, it is unknown whether the judgment on one item was caused by
the judgment on another item. The current research did not study the internal causality
between each item. This limitation can be further studied in later research.
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Appendix 1: Experimental Cases

Case (quantitatively material fraud)
Your team is providing tax compliance services for a client, a company with sales
of RMB1,000 million and total assets of RMB500 million. This client is audited by
another firm which is not associated to your firm, and has been consistently issued a
“clean” audit report for many years.
However, the company is in fact operating a tax fraud in an area where you are
conducting your tax work. The fraud involves both the purchasing and selling of
goods outside the company’s books, the cash flows from these activities being
recorded in hidden accounts. As a result of this fraud, the company’s taxable income,
at RMB100 million, is understated by RMB40 million and thus tax expense, at RMB25
million, is understated by RMB10 million. Accounting income after tax, at RMB150
million, is understated by a net amount of RMB30 million.
No one from the client or from the audit team has yet detected the fraud.

Case (quantitatively immaterial fraud)
Your team is providing tax compliance services for a client, a company with sales
of RMB1,000 million and total assets of RMB500 million. This client is audited by
another firm which is not associated to your firm, and has been consistently issued a
“clean” audit report for many years.
However, the company is in fact operating a tax fraud in an area where you are
conducting your tax work. The fraud involves both the purchasing and selling of
goods outside the company’s books, the cash flows from these activities being
recorded in hidden accounts. As a result of this fraud, the company’s taxable income,
at RMB100 million, is understated by RMB1 million and thus tax expense, at RMB25
million, is understated by RMB0.25 million. Accounting income after tax, at RMB150
million, is understated by a net amount of RMB0.75 million.
No one from the client or from the audit team has yet detected the fraud.
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Appendix 2: Measurement Scales

Triangle Model of Responsibility Measures:

Professional Obligation:
How relevant is detecting this fraud to your job?
Not relevant at all

Very relevant

How obligated are you to detect this fraud?
Not obligated at all

Very obligated

Task Clarity:
How clear is your authoritative guidance for detecting this fraud?
Not clear at all

Very clear

How informed are you about the procedures you should follow to detect this fraud?
Not informed at all

Fully informed

Personal Control Link Questions:
How much control do you have as a tax professional over your ability to detect this
fraud?
No control

Full control

How much of a contribution to you believe you can make to detecting this?
No contribution

Full contribution
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Dependent Variables Measures:

How much responsibility do you have to detect this fraud?
No responsibility

Full responsibility

Please rate your client’s behaviour on the following scales:
Ethical

Unethical

Socially responsible

Not socially responsible

How likely is it that you would discover this fraud?
Highly unlikely

Highly likely

If you discover the fraud, how likely is it that you will report it?
Highly unlikely

Highly likely
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MACH IV Machiavellianism Scale

1.

Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

2.

The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

3.

One should take action only when sure it is morally right.*

4.

Most people are basically good and kind.*

5.

It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out
when they are given a chance.

6.

Honesty is the best policy in all cases.*

7.

There is no excuse for lying to someone else.*

8.

Generally speaking people won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so.

9.

All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and
dishonest.*

10.

When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons
for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.*

11.

Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.*

12.

Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.

13.

The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the
criminals are stupid enough to get caught.

14. Most people are brave.*
15.

It is wise to flatter important people.

16. It is possible to be good in all respects.*
17.

The man who said “There’s a sucker born every minute” was wrong.*

18.

It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

19.

People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put
painlessly to death.

20.

Most people forget more easily the death of a parent than the loss of their
property.

* = Reverse scored.
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